by RAY FLEMING l TWO huge tomes were circulating in Washington DC on Monday. One was the administration's annual budget proposals and the other the Pentagon's quadrennial defence review. The budget does not normally concern those of us who are not citizens of the United States but this year its emphasis on the need to provide money for military and security operations has obvious overseas implications. Some of these are spelt out in the Pentagon's review and help to clarify what is involved in the change of name for the “war on terror” to the “long war”, which Mr Bush first referred to a few days ago. The review predicts a “large scale, potentially long duration, irregular warfare campaign, including counter-insurgency and security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations”. The contrast between this grim scenario and the optimistic days of the “short war” against Iraq and the euphoria of “mission accomplished” could not be starker. In presenting the Pentagon's review US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not hold back from describing what the future holds as another “cold war”. He said: “The enemy have designed and distributed a map where national borders are erased and replaced by a global extremist Islamic empire.” Leaving aside the question of how a map shows “extremism”, it is clear where Mr Rumsfeld is heading: “A war has been declared on all of our nations whose futures depend on determination and unity.” It is difficult to resist recalling a First World War British minister who said of his own generals, “I don't know whether they frighten the enemy but, by God, they frighten me.” There have been several signs of late that the Bush administration has been worried about the quality of its intelligence. One example, on which Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice soke quite openly, was the result of the election in Palestine which Washington expected Fatah, not Hamas, to win. Talk of a “long war” therefore probably represents an uprading of assessments of the threat posed by worldwide Islamic militancy. The wider implication, of course, is that America's allies, especially those in Europe and members of Nato, will be expected to play their part in this “long war”. How many of them will be willing to do this, and at what cost?